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1. Introduction  
1.1. Statement of Thesis  
International humanitarian law (IHL) regulates and limits the conduct of parties to, and the treatment 
of victims of armed conflict, whether civilian or hors de combat1, in addition to the means and 
methods of warfare.2 A current issue within IHL is the treatment and protection of civilians who have 
taken a direct part in hostilities.3   
There are multiple provisions within IHL concerning DPH.4 However, neither of the provisions in The 
Hague Conventions5, its Annexed Regulations6, the Geneva Conventions, nor its Additional Protocols 
defines which actions amounts to DPH. One of the reasons is that the drafters of the Geneva 
Conventions and its Additional Protocols could not agree on a comprehensive definition.  
DPH has been one of the components of discussions within IHL since 1977.7 Legal experts from all 
over the world have tried to agree on a definition of which actions amount to DPH, and its scope of 
application.8 In 2009 the International Committee for the Red Cross9 published its “Interpretive 
Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities”.10 Therein, the ICRC provides a 
definition of DPH. However, this definition was not a product of unanimous consensus or agreement, 
and it therefore solely reflects the ICRC’s interpretation of DPH.11  
The consequences for these civilians have not been at the center of the discussions regarding DPH. 
However, the consequences are an important aspect of DPH and might in turn shed some light on 
                                                          
1
 Hors de combat is defined in Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 - Relating to 
the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (adopted 8 June 1977) Article 41(2).   
Combatant status is a prerequisite for becoming “hors de combat”; see Henckaerts, Jean-Marie, Doswald-Beck, 
Louise: Customary International Humanitarian Law: Volume I: Rules (Cambridge University Press, 2009) Rule 47 
at 164-170. See also Dinstein, Yoram; The Conduct of Hostilities under the Law of International Armed Conflict 
(Cambridge University Press, 2010) at 159. Persons rendered “hors de combat” are protected from attack 
according to customary international law; see API Article 41(1), CIL Study Rule 47 at 164 
2
 Fleck, Dieter: The Handbook of International Humanitarian Law (Oxford University Press, 2008) at 11.  
International Humanitarian Law is also referred to as the law of armed conflicts.  
3
 Hereafter DPH  
4
 See Article 3 in Convention (I) for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces 
in the Field (adopted 12 August 1949), Convention (II) for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded, 
Sick and Shipwrecked Members of the Armed Forces at Sea (adopted 12 August 1949), Convention (III) relative 
to the Treatment of Prisoners of War (adopted 12 August 1949), and Convention (IV) relative to the Protection 
of Civilian Persons in Time of War (adopted 12 August 1946), API Article 51(3), 77(2) and (3). See also Protocol 
Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 – Relating to the Victims of Non-International Armed 
Conflicts (adopted 8 June 1977) Article 13(3). 
5
 Hague Convention IV respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land of 1907 (adopted 18 October 1910) is 
the only one still in force.   
6
 Regulations Concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land annexed to Hague Convention IV (adopted 18 
October 1907).  
7
 In 1977, DPH was codified in the two Additional Protocols to the Geneva Conventions. However, the first 
appearance of direct participation was in 1949, in Common Article 3 to the Geneva Conventions.    
8
 See the International Committee for the Red Cross study on DPH from 2003-2009.  
9
 Hereafter the ICRC 
10 ICRC: Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities under International 
Humanitarian Law (Geneva, 2009). Hereafter Interpretive Guidance.  
11
 Interpretive Guidance at 10, Melzer, Nils: The Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in 
Hostilities (IRRC, Volume 90, Number 872, December 2008 pp 991-1047) 
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the suggested interpretation of DPH.12 This thesis will focus on the consequences of direct 
participation in hostilities applicable throughout the duration of the engagement, as a response to 
previous and future engagement, and in the event of capture or detainment by the adverse party 
during armed conflicts.  
1.2. The Geneva Conventions: A Brief Background   
The protection awarded to certain people under specific circumstances by the law of armed conflict, 
can generally be traced back to past atrocities.13 The goal of codification is to prevent such atrocities 
from occurring in the future. However, the rapid evolution of modern warfare and the unwillingness 
of some States to ratify these codifications, make is nearly impossible to achieve a complete 
codification of the conduct of hostilities.14  
There have been multiple attempts to codify the IHL. The initial treaties such as the St. Petersburg 
Declaration of 189815, the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907, along with the annexed Hague 
Regulations16 are all based on the principle of distinction, and expressly state that the conduct of 
hostilities is not unlimited.17 The next step of codification was the four Geneva Conventions in 1949.18 
These focus on the protection of war victims.19 The GCs have been universally accepted, and are 
ratified by nearly every State in the world.20 They apply to all international armed conflicts between 
the parties to the Conventions.21 However, the application is not contingent upon the adversary 
being a party to the Conventions, if the adversary accepts and applies the provisions therein.22  
In 1968 the UNGA invited the ICRC to study the need for additional humanitarian conventions or 
other legal instruments to ensure better protection of civilians, prisoners and combatants during 
armed conflicts.23 This indicates that the UNGA viewed the protection awarded by the existing 
Conventions as insufficient or entailed insufficient limitations on the conduct of hostilities. 
The four GCs were supplemented by two Additional Protocols in 1977.24 The Protocols address issues 
that arise due to direct and actual conduct of hostilities in armed conflicts. API contains codifications 
such as the principle of distinction (Articles 48 and 43(2)), provisions regarding the general protection 
awarded to the civilian population (Part IV), as well as precautions in attack (Articles 57 and 58). APII 
                                                          
12
 Interpretive Guidance at 43-60   
13
 Quenivet, Noelle, Sha-Davis, Shilan(eds): International Law and Armed Conflict: Challenges in the 21
st
 Century 
(T.M.C. Asser Press, 2010) at 3-4 
14
 Cassese, Antonio: On Some Merits of the Israeli Judgment on Targeted Killings (JICL, Volume 5, 2007) at 341 
15
 The Declaration Renouncing the Use, in Time of War, of Explosive Projectiles Under 400 Grammes Weight, of 
29 November 1898.  
16
 The purpose of the Hague Regulations was to protect prisoners of war, civilians and neutral persons.   
17
 The Preamble to the St. Petersburg Declaration, Hague Regulations Articles 22 and 25, and Preamble to the 
Hague Convention IV of 1907 
18
 Hereafter GC I, GC II, GC III, GC IV and the GCs 
19
 This is apparent from the names and content of the GCs, see also Dinstein: Hostilities at 16  
20
 GC I-IV each has 194 contracting State parties, API has 171 State Parties and 4 Signatories, and APII has 166 
State Parties and 3 Signatories: <http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/CONVPRES?OpenView>, accessed 14.10.2011  
21
 GC I-IV Common Article 2(1) and (2)  
22
 Ibid (3) 
23
 United Nations General Assembly Resolution 2444 of 19 December 1968, Tehran, Section 2, litra (b)  
24
 API concerns international armed conflicts (IACs), and APII concerns non-international armed conflicts 
(NIACs). These Protocols do not supersede the GCs; see API Article 49(4), Dinstein: Hostilities at 16. 
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does not contain the same elaborate protection of the civilians. The scope of protection under API is 
therefore wider than the protection awarded by the GCs and APII.25 
1.3. The Challenges of Modern Warfare  
Some of the challenges which arise during armed conflicts relate to the protection of the civilian 
population, and how to deal with civilians who engage in DPH. There has been an increased trend of 
civilians engaging in DPH in modern armed conflicts. Some of the reasons for this can be found in the 
historical and technological developments of warfare, which I will explore in the following.    
Historically wars have been fought between the armed forces of the sovereign parties to an armed 
conflict, with clearly defined strategic objectives.26 During these conflicts only a small minority of 
civilians participated in the conduct of military operations.27 These conflicts therefore had a relatively 
clear distinction between combatants and civilians. The members of the adversary’s armed forces 
could in most cases be identified through their uniform.   
After the Cold War the characteristics of warfare changed as a result of the downsizing of defence 
budgets and consequently of the armed forces.28 This led to an increased outsourcing of previously 
almost exclusively military tasks.29 By outsourcing such tasks to private contractors, governments 
were able to cut its military expenses. The government neither has to invest the same time nor 
money, to train and educate private contractors, as they would should the task be performed by 
members of their own armed forces.30 Hence, the use of private contractors enables a higher number 
armed forces personnel to participate in combat missions and other combat related functions.31 And 
in turn, contributes to the increased number of civilians engaged in DPH during military operations.  
In modern warfare the adversary may be the armed forces of a sovereign state, an organized armed 
group or another non-governmental party.32 Recently armed conflicts seems to be fought between 
the armed forces of a sovereign state and organized armed groups not representing the armed forces 
of a state, i.e. the war on terror between the US and Al-Qaeda. These members are typically not 
entitled to combatant status. The issue of whether they are engaged in DPH and the temporal scope 
in which they may be targeted is crucial in relation to the legality of directly attacking them. Now 
more than ever, the ability to distinguish enemy from civilian, is an important prerequisite for the 
success of the attack.33  
Modern warfare has taken a step away from the traditional battlefield, into urban landscapes, i.e. 
cities and small towns. This development has resulted in increased encounters with the civilian 
                                                          
25
 Solis, Gary: The Law of Armed Conflict – International Humanitarian law in War (Cambridge University Press, 
2010) at 122.  
26
 Supra note 13 at 3,10 
27
 Interpretive Guidance at 11-12 
28
 Fleck: Handbook at 107-108, 
29
 Schmitt, Michael N: “Direct Participation in Hostilities” and 21
st
 Century Armed Conflict (Crisis Management 
and Humanitarian Protection, Festschrift fur Dieter Fleck, 2004) at 513.  
Schmitt, Michael N: Humanitarian Law and Direct Participation in Hostilities by Private Contractors or Civilian 
Employees (CJIL, Volume 5, Number 2, 2005) at 512-514.  
30
 Schmitt: 21
st
 century at 513, Fleck: Handbook at 107-108  
31
 Schmitt; IHL and DPH at 517-518  
32
 Supra note 13 at 3 
33
 Williams, Dewi: The Often-Vexed Question of Direct Participation in Hostilities: A Possible Solution to a 
fraught Legal Position (JPL, Volume 2, Number 1, March 2009) at 3 -6 
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population. The increased presence of civilians accompanying the armed forces, civilians who 
participate in the conduct of military operation, as well as civilians who engage in DPH wearing 
civilian attire, makes it challenging to distinguish the adversary’s combatants from members of the 
civilian population. The inability to distinguish these from the rest of the civilian population puts the 
armed forces at risk of being targeted by an adversary they cannot identify.34 Warfare in urban 
settings therefore makes it difficult to fulfil the obligation to protect civilians from the effects of 
military operations.35 Furthermore, the outsourcing of traditionally military functions to private 
contractors has caused some confusion as to who is entitled to protection from direct attack.36  
These factors have made it increasingly difficult to distinguish between legitimate military targets, 
and persons protected from direct attack.37 Consequently, the vast majority of casualties in armed 
conflicts are civilians.38 
This is further complicated should the adversary fails to comply with the obligation to distinguish 
themselves from the civilian population.39 Add to those distinguishing civilians who engage in DPH 
from the rest of the civilian population, acting in compliance with the fundamental principle of 
distinction is not easy.  All these elements can lead to erroneous or arbitrary targeting of civilians.40  
Due to the recent leap in technological advances modern warfare is reliant on weapon systems, and 
hence on private contractors and civilian employees.41 The technology is highly advanced and the 
acquiring of weapons system may include civilians responsible for maintenance, training, and even 
system operators.42 These weapons systems have made it possible to locate and target specific 
objects and persons with great precision.43 As a result wars are fought with the assistance of civilian 
employees, located on another continent, or at a safe distance from the hostilities, i.e. the predator 
unmanned aerial vehicle, and computer network attack.44 
The use of precision guided weapons has the potential to spare lives, both civilian and combatant.45 
However, these systems are highly reliant on accurate intelligence in order to effectively take out the 
desired military objective.46 This reliance is both a strength and a weakness. If the intelligence is bad, 
there is an inherent risk that the attack may have caused injury or death to members of the civilian 
population instead of the desired military objective.  
1.4. Sources and Method  
                                                          
34
 Interpretive Guidance at 12  
35
 API Article 51(1) 
36
 GC IV Part II, API Articles 48, 51, APII Article 13, and Interpretive Guidance at 11-12 
37
 API Articles 48, 51(1) and (2), APII Article 13(1) and (2), Schmitt: 21
st
 Century at 515-516, Dinstein: Hostilities 
at 121-126(- 155) 
38
 S/RES/1296(2000): Civilians are increasingly being targeted by or suffer from violence directed against them. 
See also Rowe, Peter: The Impact of Human Rights Law on Armed Forces (Cambridge University Press, 2006) at 
1-5  
39
 API Article 44(3)  
40
 Interpretive Guidance at 11-12 
41
 Schmitt: 21
st
 Century at 511, 512  
42
 Ibid at 513 , Schmitt: IHL and DPH at 544-545 
43
 Primoratz, Igor(eds): Civilian Immunity in War (Oxford University Press,2007) at 185  
44
 Schmitt:21
st
 Century at 525-528  
45
 Primoratz: Civilian Immunity at 184 
46
 Schmitt: 21
st
 century at 517-518  
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The sources used to determine a rule of international law are listed in the Statute of the International 
Court of Justice Article 38(1).47 The primary sources are international conventions, establishing rules 
expressly recognized by the contracting states (a), international custom, as evidence of a general 
practice accepted as law (b), and general principles of law (c). Judicial decisions and the teachings of 
the most highly qualified publicists are secondary sources (d). Despite their secondary status, they 
may provide guidance and be persuasive when establishing the content of a rule under international 
law.48 
I will apply these sources within the context and parameters of IHL.  
The primary sources for the purpose of this thesis are the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and their 
Additional Protocols. However, the focus will be on GC III, IV, API and APII. They will be interpreted 
“in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning” of the terms in their context, and in light of 
the object and purpose of the treaty in question.49 The secondary sources entail publications of 
highly qualified experts within IHL. In addition the Targeted Killings Case from the Israeli High Court 50 
provides an illustration of the application of DPH. The case concerned the legality of Israel’s 
employment of a policy of preventive strikes against terrorists, which could also involve killing 
innocent civilians.  
The ICRC is an independent, impartial and neutral organization, with an exclusive humanitarian 
mission.51 Their main purpose is to protect the lives and dignity of victims of armed conflict. It seeks 
to prevent suffering by promoting and strengthening IHL and universal humanitarian principles. For 
instance, it promotes a faithful application of the Geneva Conventions and the Additional Protocols.52 
The weight of ICRC publications can therefore be placed in the category of “highly qualified publicists” 
as a secondary source within IHL.53 The CIL Study will be used to illustrate existing customary state 
practice. However, this study is not in itself a binding expression of rules of customary international 
law.  
The Interpretive Guidance provides guidance to some of the consequences of DPH. It examines DPH 
in relation to the conduct of hostilities, but it did not address issues in the event of capture or 
detainment by the adverse party.54 Some of the positions taken therein are controversial and have 
been subject to critique.55 Furthermore, the Interpretive Guidance is not a binding expression of the 
                                                          
47
 The Statute of the International Court of Justice of 17 July 1998, The Rome Statute.  
48
 Currie, Forcese, Oosterveld: International Law: Doctrine, Practice and Theory (Irwin Law, 2007) at 145 
49
 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties of 23 May 1969, Article 31(1) , VCLT 
50 The Government of Israel et al v The Public Committee against Torture in Israel et al (Supreme Court of Israel, 
Judgment of 11 December 2005) 
51
 Statute of the ICRC, Article 1,  
< http://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/misc/icrc-statutes-080503.htm>  
52
 Mission Statement of 19.06.2008, accessed 09.09.2011. 
 < http://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/misc/icrc-mission-190608.htm>  
53
 ICRC publications are not legally binding on states. Treaties and customary international law are binding on 
states, see Currie, Forcese, Oosterveld: International Law at 40, 79, Interpretive Guidance at 6. See also VLCLT 
Article 34 and 38. 
54
 Interpretive Guidance at 11  
55
 Some of the critiques: Boothby, Bill: “And for such time as”: The Time Dimension to Direct Participation in 
Hostilities ( International Law and Politics, 2010, Volume 41), Schmitt, Michael N: The Interpretive Guidance on 
the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities: A Critical Analysis (HNSJ, May 2010, Volume 1), Schmitt, Michael 
N: Deconstructing Direct Participation in Hostilities; The Constitutive Elements (International Law and Politics, 
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interpretation and application of DPH. This weakens the weight and impact of the views on the 
consequences of DPH. However, it does illustrate some challenges in relation to applying DPH to 
actions in armed conflict. 
1.5. Scope of the Thesis  
This thesis will neither provide a definition of the requirements for an act to amount to DPH, nor 
engage in an analysis of which activities amounts to DPH. However, in order to analyse the 
consequences of DPH, it is necessary with a working definition for the purpose of this thesis.  
Direct participation in hostilities is “acts of war which by their nature or purpose are likely to cause 
[or contribute to] actual harm to the personnel, equipment [or military operations] of the enemy 
armed forces.”56 Such preparatory activities may amount to DPH. Contribution to the general war 
effort is not sufficient, and there must be a causal relationship to specific activities amounting to 
DPH.57 Activities with too weak a connection to the conduct of hostilities, falls outside the scope of 
DPH. 
The second section presents the different categories of persons under IHL, and hence who the notion 
of DPH applies to. I will therein illustrate some of the many challenges combatants face during 
modern armed conflicts. An analysis of the consequences of DPH is provided in section 3. The 
different consequences relates to those applicable during the actual engagement in DPH, and those 
applicable as a reaction to previous engagement in DPH. The loss of protection from direct attack and 
hence becoming a legitimate military target are consequences applicable during the actual 
engagement in DPH. Whereas the standards of treatment and protection upon detention or capture 
and subjection to prosecution and punishment as consequences applicable as a reaction to previous 
engagement in DPH.   
Some practical implications of applying DPH during actual armed conflicts will be presented in 
section 4. Whether there exists a presumption of DPH in situations of doubt, and if combatants are 
obligated to respond with the least harmful means available, are questions closely connected to the 
consequences of DPH.  
2. Who Has Directly Participated in Hostilities? 
2.1. The Principle of Distinction  
One of the fundamental principles underlying IHL is the principle of distinction.58 The Preamble to the 
St. Petersburg Declaration states that “the military forces of the enemy” are “the only legitimate” 
targets for attack. Consequently, those who do not belong to enemy’s military forces are not 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
2010, Volume 42), Van der Toorn, Damien; Direct Participation in Hostilities: A Legal and Practical Evaluation of 
the ICRC Guidance (Attorney General’s Department, Commonwealth of Australia, 2009), Watkin, Kenneth; 
Opportunity Lost: Organized Armed Groups and the ICRC “Direct Participation in Hostilities Interpretive 
Guidance (International Law and Politics, 2010, Volume 42)   
56
 Commentary to API Article 51(3) paragraph 1944, Fleck; Handbook at 261-262 
57
 Commentary to API Article 43(2) paragraph 1679, Article 51(3) paragraph 1945 , Fleck: Handbook at 262  
58
 Solis: LOAC at 251 (-253), Dinstein: Hostilities at 8, 89, Fleck: Handbook at 238. The principle of distinction is 
codified in API Article 48, 51(1) and (2) and APII Article 13(1) and (2). The ICJ stated that the principle of 
distinction is a “cardinal principle” of IHL, see Advisory Opinion on Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear 
Weapons of 8 July 1996 paragraph 78 
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legitimate targets, and may not be targeted.59 This illustrates the longstanding limitation on the right 
to adopt means and methods of injuring the enemy during armed conflicts.  
 The principle imposes an obligation on the parties to an armed conflict to distinguish between 
combatants and civilians at all times. This obligation is two folded.60 Firstly, the parties must only 
direct their attacks and military operations against legitimate military targets. Civilians and the 
civilian population are protected from attack61, because such attacks would be of little to no military 
advantage.62 This part of the obligation is considered a rule of customary international law.63  
API Article 48 must be read in conjunction with Article 49 which provides a definition of attacks. 
Regardless of whether a party to the conflict is attacking or the party under attack, all violent acts in 
relation to the adversary are considered attacks.64  
The second part is the obligation of combatants to distinguish themselves from civilians, by wearing a 
distinctive emblem that is recognizable at a distance. This obligation applies when they engage “in an 
attack or in a military operation preparatory to an attack.”65 Without such means of distinguishing 
combatants from civilians, there is a presumption of civilian status until otherwise can be 
confirmed.66  
Another element of the principle of distinction is determining whether or not an individual is a 
legitimate military target through all feasible steps.67 If combatants are unable to distinguish 
between combatants and civilians, any person they encounter would have to be considered a 
possible threat and this would represent a great risk to the protected civilian population. 
According to the principle of distinction there is a fundamental difference between combatants and 
civilians. In order to determine who the concept of DPH applies to, one must first eliminate those 
who qualify as combatants.  
2.2. Combatant and Civilian Status     
Members of the armed forces of a Party to a conflict are combatants, regardless of their conduct and 
function therein.68 Combatants “have the right to participate directly in hostilities”.69 An antithetical 
                                                          
59
  Supra note 15, Solis: LOAC at 50  
60
 Solis: LOAC at 250-258, Melzer: Targeted Killings at 301-304, 311-314  
61
 API Article 50(2) states that individual civilians and the civilian population “shall not be the object of attack”. 
In addition they “enjoy general protection against dangers arising from military operations, see (1). See also the 
equivalent APII Article 13(1) and (2) 
62
 Dahl, Arne Willy; Håndbok i Militær Folkerett (Cappelen Akademiske Forlag, 2008) at 132 
63
 Dinstein: Hostilities at 89, 124, Prosecutor vs. Blackic, ICTY Judgment of 29 July 2004 paragraph 109, CIL 
Study Rule 1 at 3-8, Solis: LOAC at 251-252, Commentary to API Article 48 paragraph 598    
64
 API Article 49(1). Regarding its territorial application see (2). 
65
 Ibid Article 44(3) 
66
 Ibid Article 50(1)  
67
 The precautions in attack API Article 57 and 58, See Solis at 254, Dinstein: Hostilities at 138-146, Melzer, Nils: 
Targeted Killings in International Law (Oxford University Press, 2009) at 354-357, 363-366.  
68
 API Article 43(1) and (2), Interpretive Guidance at 25, Watkin: Opportunities Lost at 651, Solis: LOAC at 188 
69
 API Article 43(2) in conjunction with (1), see also Hague Regulations Article 3.  
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interpretation indicates that civilians are not entitled to engage in DPH. However, not all members of 
the armed forces are combatants. Medical and religious personnel are non-combatants.70  
API Article 43(1) provides a definition of the armed forces. These do not consist of a group of 
individuals carrying out single acts in order to achieve personal goals. They are entitled to engage 
directly in hostilities on behalf of a Party to the conflict, in order to achieve the goal of said Party.71 
Accordingly the right to engage in DPH is a consequence of combatant status.72 The criteria for 
combatant status are further contained in GC III Article 4A, which directly regulates entitlement to 
prisoner of war status.73 Members of other militias, volunteer corps, or organized resistance 
movements must fulfil four cumulative conditions in order to be entitled to prisoner of war74 
status:75 
(a)  being commanded by a person responsible for his subordinates; 
(b) having a fixed distinctive sign recognizable at a distance;  
(c) carrying arms openly;  
(d) conducting their operations in accordance with the laws and customs of war
 
 
These conditions do not seem to apply to members of the regular armed forces. However, they are 
presumed to meet these conditions collectively, and are therefore combatants.76  
Furthermore, the conditions in litra b and c are not as clear as the wording implies. These conditions 
are modified by API Article 44(3).77 The obligation to carry arms openly is restricted in situations 
where “an armed combatant cannot” distinguish himself from the civilian population, to the duration 
of “each military engagement” (a), and the engagement “in a military deployment preceding the 
launching of an attack in which he is to participate” when he is “visible to the adversary” (b).  
The cumulative criteria of POW status make it difficult for members of organized armed groups who 
do not belong to a party to the conflict, to gain combatant status.78 These groups typically do not 
have a “fixed distinctive sign” which identifies and separates them from the civilian population. The 
purpose of this requirement is not to impose an obligation of visibility, but to distinguish them from 
the civilian population if they are seen.79  
Furthermore, it is not unusual for members of such organized armed groups to conceal their 
weapons until the time immediately prior to an attack. This enables them to take advantage of the 
presumption of civilian status80, and may allow them to get closer to their target without being 
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targeted themselves.81 Should a combatant fail to comply with the obligation to distinguish himself 
from the civilian population, and identify himself as a combatant82, he will no longer be entitled to 
the privileges of a POW upon capture or detention.83 
If the individual does not fall into the categories listed in GC III Article 4A(1)-(3), or (6) nor API Article 
43, that individual is a civilian.84 Civilians are negatively defined, which indicates that the category is 
exhaustive, including all those who do not qualify for combatant status during IACs. The purpose of 
distinguishing between combatants and civilians is to ensure protection of the innocent, non 
participating civilian.85 There is no equivalent definition of civilians during NIACs.86 Hence, the 
distinction between combatants and protected civilians is not as clear, which in turn puts the concept 
of DPH in a different light. However, a distinction is made between civilians who engage in DPH and 
civilians who remain protected during NIACs.87   
2.3. Who is engaged in DPH?  
Those who engage in DPH without being entitled to do so are civilians. DPH can be divided into four 
types of engagements. It may be a civilian who sporadically engages in activities amounting to DPH 
on his or her own initiative, or a civilian who repeatedly and continuously engages in DPH.88 The 
civilian may be a member of an organized armed group or s/he may be accompanying the armed 
forces without being a member thereof, i.e. private contractors and civilian employees.89  
2.3.1. Direct Participation in Hostilities – The Limitation on the Right to Civilian Protection  
The principle of distinction gives the impression that there exists a clear cut distinction between 
combatants and civilians. However, the protection from direct attack is neither unconditional nor 
absolute. API Article 51(3) and APII Article 13(3) limit the protection of civilians. They are protected 
as civilians “unless and for such time as they take a direct part in hostilities”.90 During this time the 
civilian “loses his immunity and becomes a legitimate military target. Once he ceases to participate, 
[s/he] regains [the] right to protection”.91 This is a rule of customary international law.92 
This limitation is without a clear cut content, due to the lack of definition of which actions amount to 
DPH. This poses a great challenge for commanders and soldiers who are attacked by civilians 
engaged in DPH.  
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The loss of entitlement to civilian protection illustrates the balance between the principle of 
distinction and the principle of military necessity. Such civilians pose a risk to combatants and it is 
reasonable that protection as a civilian is contingent upon them not engaging in DPH.93 Civilians who 
lose their protection due to DPH, are legitimate military targets, and may be targeted as such.94  
The wording “for such time as” provides little guidance as to the temporal application of DPH. This 
raises questions as to when and for how long such civilians lose the protection against direct attack, 
how long they remain a legitimate military target, and when they may be targeted as such. These 
concerns will be addressed in section 3.2.   
2.3.1.1. State Practice and Statements  
Unlike the GCs, API is not universally accepted.95 The United States have issued a formal statement 
rejecting API:  
“[T]his agreement has certain meritorious elements. But Protocol I is fundamentally and 
irreconcilably flawed. It contains provisions that would undermine humanitarian law and 
endanger civilians in war […] These problems are so fundamental in character that they cannot 
be remedied through reservations. [...] Finally, [...] a number of the provisions of the Protocol are 
militarily unacceptable. [...]”96  
It is particularly the protection of civilians within Articles 48 to 67 the US finds fundamentally flawed. 
The US also objects to Article 47 concerning mercenaries, who are neither considered combatants 
nor POWs. The United States has previously stated that no combatants should be denied a battlefield 
status.97 However, it is debatable whether this position is still in effect considering the situation of 
the detainees incarcerated at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.98 
However, none of the ratifying States made any reservations to API Article 51. On the contrary, the 
United Kingdom stated that the exception in Article 51(3) was a “valuable reaffirmation” of an 
existing rule of customary international law.99 Mexico further stated that it “cannot be subject to any 
reservations whatsoever since these would be inconsistent with the aim and purpose of Protocol I 
and undermine its basis”.100 
2.3.2. The Process Towards the Interpretive Guidance  
The Interpretive Guidance was the product of five informal expert meetings held by the ICRC 
between 2003 and 2008, in addition to further research and analysis.101 The meetings were 
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composed of 40 to 50 legal experts, with experience from the military, governments, academia, 
international and non-governmental organizations.102 
The object was to reflect the ICRC’s institutional position on the interpretation of the existing IHL, in 
light of the prevailing circumstances of contemporary armed conflicts. The intention was not to 
change binding rules of customary or treaty law.103 The goal was to ensure a clear and coherent 
interpretation of DPH in relation to the conduct of hostilities, consistent with the purpose and 
principles of IHL.104 However, the Interpretive Guidance was not the product of unanimous consent 
among the participating experts.  
The Interpretive Guidance has been subject to critique on several grounds, by scholars and military 
personnel.105 But one of its strengths is that it provides guidance to combatants in applying the 
concept of DPH to civilians on the battlefield.106 I will in the following comment the critique as it 
relates to the consequences of DPH.  
3. The Consequences of Direct Participation in Hostilities   
3.1. The Concept of Unlawful Combatant  
The concept of unlawful combatant is controversial. IHL has traditionally operated with two 
categories of persons; combatants and civilians.107 This is evident in the GCs as well as their APs, 
supplemented by the principle of distinction. GC III concerns the treatment of prisoners of war, 
awarded to combatants, and GC IV concerns the protection of civilians in time of war. By defining 
combatants, and making the rest civilians, the categories seem to be exhaustive.108 This indicates 
that unlawful combatants are civilians, but they are not entitled to all the rights and protections 
awarded civilians who have not engaged in DPH.109  
API contains two examples of unlawful combatants, spies110 and mercenaries.111  Neither spies nor 
mercenaries are combatants nor are they entitled to POW status upon capture by the adversary.112 
However, neither of the GCs nor its APs operate with a third category of unlawful combatants. IHL 
regulates the conduct of hostilities, and states the conditions for combatant status and consequently 
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entitlement to POW status. The exceptions concerning mercenaries and spies simply state that they 
are not combatants.113 
Combatants are entitled to engage in DPH114, and are consequently legitimate targets that can be 
attacked.115 They are presumed to have POW status upon capture by the adversary.116 Combatants 
are furthermore, immune from domestic prosecution for their commitment of lawful acts of war, 
even though these constitute crimes under the national criminal code, i.e. murder, assault and 
battery.117 They can only be prosecuted for grave violations of IHL, such as i.e. war crimes.118 This is 
referred to as the combatant’s privilege, and is a consequence of their right to engage in DPH.119 The 
background for this immunity is the fact that armed conflicts consists of a multitude of violent acts 
which are penalized by domestic criminal legislation.  
Based on the principle of distinction and the definition of combatants, the right to engage in DPH 
seems to be limited to those who fulfil the requirements of combatant status. Unlawful combatants 
have been defined as civilians taking DPH who are not entitled to do so, and may be targeted due to 
their DPH.120  
The Ex Parte Quirin case concerned the legality of the detention of eight German soldiers who 
entered and committed acts of war while wearing civilian attire within US territory. The US Supreme 
Court concluded that by “passing our boundaries for such purposes without uniform or other 
emblem signifying their belligerent status, such enemies become unlawful belligerents subject to trial 
and punishment”.121 The Court stated that:  
“By universal agreement and practice, the law of war draws a distinction between the armed 
forces and the peaceful populations of belligerent nations and also between those who are 
lawful and unlawful combatants. Lawful combatants are subject to capture and detention as 
[POWs] by opposing military forces. Unlawful combatants are likewise subject to capture and 
detention, but in addition they are subject to trial and punishment by military tribunals for acts 
which render their belligerency unlawful.”122 
This statement is considered an accurate reflection of customary international law concerning 
unlawful combatants, except for the last part.123 Whether unlawful combatants can be prosecuted 
for merely having engaged in DPH, or only for their commitment of acts in violation of the domestic 
criminal legislation will be addressed in section 3.4.  
3.2. Loss of Protection From Direct Attack  
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According to API Article 51(3) and APII Article 13(3) loss of protection from direct attack is a 
consequence of DPH.  It is considered a rule of customary international law during IACs and NIACs.124 
As a result, civilians engaged in DPH become legitimate military targets, and may be attacked as such 
for the duration of their engagement.125  
3.2.1. Not Considered Civilians in the Proportionality Evaluation  
When determining whether the operation is in accordance with the principle of proportionality, 
commanders are obligated to consider the extent of possible injury or death of civilians, as well as 
the expected military advantage of taking out the objective.126 The military advantage must be 
viewed in light of the possible collateral damage.127 Only excessive collateral damage is a violation of 
the principle of proportionality. The risk of any collateral damage is not enough. If an attack causes 
excessive collateral damage, it is indiscriminate and prohibited.128  
Commanders must take feasible precautions to spare the civilian population, and to minimize the 
unavoidable harm.129 APII does not contain similar obligations of precautions, but the precautions 
contained in API are rules of customary international law which applies in both IACs and NIACs.130  
The injury or deaths of civilians who engage in DPH, who are legitimate military targets, are not 
viewed as collateral damage of the military operation.131 Civilians, who engage in DPH, are 
accordingly not considered civilians in the proportionality evaluation of the attack.   
3.2.2. The Temporal Scope of the Loss of Protection  
The civilian loses protection from direct attack “for such time as” s/he engages in DPH. The wording 
“for such time as” is at best vague and ambiguous. It raises more questions than it answers in regards 
to the specific duration of the loss of protection. Furthermore, there are no guidelines as to the 
beginning or end in any provision in the GCs or its APs. Neither legal literature nor case-law agrees on 
the conditions of the temporal scope. The lack of such guidelines is unfortunate, and can contribute 
to differential interpretations and State practice regarding the consequences for civilians engaged in 
DPH.  
The Targeted Killings case stated that the temporal scope must be determined on a case by case 
basis.132 To illustrate the different approaches the Court looked to two opposite situations. The 
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civilian who engages in DPH once, or sporadically, who “later detaches himself from that activity is 
entitled to protection”.  But a civilian member of a terrorist organization, who “commits a chain of 
hostilities”, has lost his protection from direct attack “for such time” as he is committing such acts.133  
The Commentaries to the APs indicate that the restoration of civilian protection corresponds with 
the end of DPH. When they cease to engage in DPH, they regain the protection awarded to civilians, 
and are hence protected from direct attack.134 The immunity awarded to civilians is contingent upon 
them refraining “from all hostile acts”135 and that they do not engage in DPH.136 The Commentaries 
assumes that once the act of DPH is completed, the civilian no longer poses a risk to the adversary.137 
This approach seems reasonable in relation to civilians who engage in a single, isolated act of DPH. In 
relation to civilians who repeatedly engage in DPH, such an interpretation would give the adversary a 
very small window in which these civilians may be attacked. This in turn, would grant such civilians an 
unfair advantage compared to the combatants of the adversary.  
It might be both reasonable and logical to include the time when the civilian is undertaking 
preparations, as well as the deployment and return within the temporal scope of DPH. However, 
civilians are as a rule protected from direct attack.138 The loss of protection due to DPH is temporary, 
and one should therefore be careful with expanding its temporal application.  
3.2.2.1. The Preparation of, Deployment and Retreat From Activities Amounting to DPH  
The ICRC takes a different approach to the duration of the loss of protection in its Interpretive 
Guidance. It claims that the determining factors for the duration are the beginning and end of the 
civilian’s specific acts amounting to DPH.139 These may include preparatory measures to the 
execution of the specific act of DPH, the deployment to and return from the location where the act 
was executed.140  This approach is consistent with that found in the Commentaries.  
Preparatory measures cause loss of protection, when they are of a “specific military nature and so 
closely linked to the subsequent execution of a specific hostile act that they already constitute an 
integral part of that act.”141 A general preparatory measure relating to an unspecified operation 
would not be sufficient. Distinguishing between direct and indirect participation in hostilities is 
crucial, as only the direct participation would cause loss of protection.142 
An example of a preparatory measure amounting to DPH is loading bombs onto an airplane. This 
would cause the civilian to lose protection from direct attack.143 Whether or not this is a task 
contracted out in another question. Even though there has been an increased outsourcing of 
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previously exclusive military tasks, the trend have thus far been to employ civilians in regards to 
sophisticated weapons systems and non-combat essential tasks.144  
The civilian will also lose protection from direct attack during the deployment to another location, 
where the specific act amounting to DPH will take place, if the deployment is undertaken to enable 
the execution of this act.145 However, the Interpretive Guidance claims that it is neither necessary 
nor sufficient that the preparation takes place immediately before or in close geographical proximity 
to the execution of the specific act of DPH, nor that it is indispensable for its execution.146  
Where the civilian carries out the specific act of DPH in his or her current location, the temporal 
scope is confined to the preparatory measures meeting the mentioned requirements, and the 
immediate execution of that act.147 This is, in my opinion, one of the few instances where the 
wording and application of “for such time as” leaves little doubt.  
Boothby critiques the interpretation of the temporal scope in the Interpretive Guidance, and finds 
the explanation therein flawed.148 He claims that the scope of preparatory acts which amount to DPH, 
and hence cause loss of protection from direct attack, is limited.149 This limitation consists of a 
narrow interpretation of the concepts of preparation, deployment and return.150  
In regards to preparation he claims that when a preparatory act in itself amounts to DPH, the 
deployment to the location where those preparatory measures are to be undertaken, will also 
amount to direct participation. Although, there is a limit as to how far such an approach is 
acceptable.151 Accordingly, Boothby expands the temporal scope compared to the already 
controversial understanding within the Interpretive Guidance. I find it doubtful whether such an 
expansion will be accepted as an accurate understanding of the temporal loss of protection.  
Boothby further claims that the loss of protection endures for the entire deployment, and not just 
until the civilian has separated himself from the hostilities.152 This understanding of is considerably 
wider than that found in the Interpretive Guidance.  
In a response to this critique, Melzer153 states that neither deployment nor preparatory measures are 
independent acts of direct participation, which in turn has its own deployment and preparatory 
measures.154 Instead, the former may be an integral part of an act or an operation which amounts to 
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DPH. Preparatory measures preceding deployment may amount to DPH provided they are an integral 
part of an act amounting to DPH. However, if the preparation or deployment is not an integral part, 
such actions will not amount to DPH.155  
By including deployment with the purpose of taking preparatory measures as an act of direct 
participation, it is my view that Boothby interprets the duration of the loss of protection too widely. 
The views expressed by Melzer and by extension the Interpretive Guidance, draw a line which can be 
employed during actual armed conflicts. I find it highly important to keep in mind that the duration 
of the loss of protection, is of great importance to combatants who might be targeted by such 
civilians. If the duration is stretched too far, there is an increased risk that civilians entitled to 
protection from direct attack, may be erroneously targeted.  
The concept of DPH is essential in order to ensure the protection of civilians. Boothby therefore 
claims that the temporal scope must allow for the targeting of those who on a recurring or persistent 
basis engage in DPH.156 If DPH is interpreted in another manner, it would pose an increased risk to 
the innocent and protected civilian.157 I my opinion the Interpretive Guidance provides a workable 
guidance for combatants when distinguishing protected civilians from those who engaged in DPH. 
Granted the Interpretive Guidance does not contain a complete review of the consequences of DPH, 
it attempts to provide guidance as to the duration of the loss of protection for civilians who engage in 
DPH.  
3.2.2.2. The Revolving Door Phenomenon  
 The revolving door describes the situation where a civilian loses and regains protection against 
direct attack due to DPH, with brief periods of non-participation in between these activities.158 
Accordingly it relates to civilians who repeatedly or persistently engage in DPH.159 Such civilians pose 
a threat to combatants. It might seem unfair to combatants that once the civilians’ engagement in 
DPH is over, at least for the time being, s/he is protected from direct attack. The temporal scope of 
their loss of protection has been subject to critique partly because it gives such civilians an advantage 
compared to combatants, who are legitimate targets regardless of the task they are performing.160  
The Interpretive Guidance distinguishes between individual civilians and members of organized 
armed groups.161 This is because the loss of protection for civilians is a temporary result of individual 
actions amounting to DPH, whereas combatants not enjoy such protection due to their continuous 
status.162 If a civilian who repeatedly engage in DPH, would lose his or her protection from direct 
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attack beyond the execution of specific acts or operations, the loss of protection would not 
temporary, but continuous.163  
The individual civilian regains his or her protection when s/he is no longer engaged in specific hostile 
activities amounting to DPH as s/he no longer represents a threat.164 Due to the difficulties 
associated with predicting or anticipating the behaviour of individual civilians, is argued that the 
revolving door prevents attacks on civilians who do not pose a threat to combatants or military 
objectives.165 Even though the civilian has repeatedly engaged in DPH, this fact is not considered a 
reliable prediction of the civilian’s future conduct in hostilities.166   
This application of the revolving door may cause difficulties for the adverse party’s ability to 
effectively respond to the threat posed by civilians who engages in DPH. However, the Interpretive 
Guidance states that this is an acceptable price to pay to protect the civilian population from 
erroneous or arbitrary attacks, provided that the DPH occurs on a merely spontaneous, sporadic and 
unorganized basis.167  
There is some disagreement whether there exists a “revolving door” of protection under customary 
international law.168 Some of this disagreement relates to the example of the famer by day, soldier by 
night. Boothby argues that the periods between the persistent participants engagement in DPH, are 
preparation for the next act of DPH. These individuals therefore continuously lose their protection 
from direct attack for the duration of the persistent or repeated engagement in DPH.169 Schmitt 
states that such civilians remain a legitimate military targeted until s/he has unambiguously opted 
out, through extended non-participation or an affirmative withdrawal, even though that engagement 
in DPH is over. This approach contains an incentive for civilians to refrain from engaging DPH, which 
is practical in combat operations. As civilians are not entitled to engage in DPH, it is reasonable that 
they may be targeted, if the adversary is unaware of their withdrawal.170 Accordingly, these civilians 
should not benefit from a revolving door of protection.171 
Melzer argues that that the revolving door seems more controversial than it actually is. It is more 
likely that civilians, who regularly and consistently engage in DPH, are members of an organized 
armed group, and have a continuous combat function therein.172 Accordingly, it is very unlikely that a 
civilian who engages in DPH on a recurring and persistent basis, without an affiliation with an 
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organized armed group, would be a major problem.173 Considering the characteristics of modern 
armed conflicts, I would agree with this statement. Resent issues concerning DPH include suicide 
bombers and those assembling and placing IED’s. Such individuals are typically affiliated with an 
organized armed group. 
Members of organized armed groups, belonging to a non-state party to the conflict, lose the 
protection awarded to civilians, for as long as they have a continuous combat function within the 
group.174 These members are not considered to participate in hostilities in a spontaneous, sporadic 
or unorganized manner. It is therefore argued that the standard for determining the loss of 
protection from direct attack for individual civilians and members of organized armed groups cannot 
be the same.175 If the same standard was applied, these members would only be legitimate targets 
during their actual engagement in DPH. The revolving door would then provide these groups with a 
significant operational advantage compared to the regular armed forces.176  
Members of the regular armed forces are combatants as a consequence of their membership 
therein.177 Furthermore, they are legitimate targets regardless of whether they are engaged in an act 
of DPH at that time or not.178 An application of the same standard for civilians and members of an 
organized armed group would cause an imbalance which could encourage these groups to operate as 
farmers by day, and fighters by night.  
However, the application of “continuous combat function” as criterion for the loss of protection is 
not without problems. It can be argued that it grants these groups a unique status, which makes it 
difficult to identify and successfully target its members.179 Members without a continuous combat 
function remain protected and cannot be targeted.180 An example is a civilian engaged in support 
functions on behalf of the organized armed group, regardless of whether that function is substantial 
or integrated to the continuous combat function of other members or not.181 If the same support 
functions are performed by a member of the regular armed forces, that individual would be a 
legitimate target.182 Members of the regular armed forces are not civilians, regardless of their 
function and individual conduct.183 
The Targeted Killings case  stated that the revolving door, would grant civilians who join a terrorist 
organization immunity from attack, when they “return in order to rest and prepare” for the next 
attack, and that was to be avoided.184 For these terrorist the “rest between hostilities is [...] 
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preparation for the next hostility.” These members therefore lose their immunity from attack “for 
such time as” they are committing a “chain of hostilities with short periods of rest between them”.185 
The concept of a continuous combat function cannot be found in the treaty body. The term was a 
creation of the Interpretive Guidance.186 This indicates that there is no legal standing for the 
application of a different standard to members of an organized armed group, and other civilians.187  
However, the concept illustrates the evolution and continued interpretation of the GCs and the 
APs.188 The continuous combat function is a necessary response to the developments of terrorism 
and weapons in the 21st century.189 It would contradict the treaties and customary international law, 
if the loss of protection was tied to “a function further removed from the conduct of hostilities.”190 
Therefore the determining factor for loss of protection must be “whether the person assumes a 
continuous function for the [organized armed] group involving his or her” DPH.191 This criterion will 
contribute to the protection of the civilian population, and hence to the respect for IHL.  
The Interpretive Guidance operates with an additional criterion for loss of protection from direct 
attack. The civilian must be a member of the organized armed group.192 However, it may be difficult 
to decisively determine such membership. This is due to the secret and informal structures of these 
groups, as well as differing criteria for membership.193 Membership has no basis in domestic law, 
which is usually the case with membership in the regular armed forces. Furthermore, membership is 
“rarely formalized through an act of integration other than taking up a certain function for the 
group”, nor is it “consistently expressed though uniforms [or] fixed distinctive signs.”194 
The protection from direct attack is resumed when the individual no longer holds a continuous 
combat function. A positive declaration of disengagement, conclusive behaviour, reintegration into 
civilian life or permanently switching to an exclusively non-combat function are examples of how this 
can be achieved.195 Whether or not the individual holds a continuous combat function must be 
determined in good faith, according to a reasonable assessment of the prevailing circumstances.196  
The treatment and protections of civilians, who have engaged in DPH, will be further explored in 
section 3.4. and 3.5.  
3.3. Not Entitled to Prisoner of War Status Upon Capture  
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Historically, POW status has been granted to those who are allowed to engage in DPH, due to their 
combatant status. An example is the Lieber Code197 Article 82, which denies those who are not 
entitled to “commit hostilities”, yet “do so with intermitting returns to their homes [...] with the 
occasional assumption of the semblance of peaceful pursuits, divesting themselves of the character 
of appearance of soldiers[...]”, the privileges of POWs.  
POW status upon capture or detainment by the adverse party is awarded to those who fulfil the 
requirements contained in GC III Article 4A.198 Accordingly, members of the regular armed forces of a 
party to the conflict, members of militias and other volunteer corps part of such armed forces are 
entitled to POW status. Members of other militias, volunteer corps or organized resistance 
movements who do not fulfil the four cumulative criteria are not entitled to POW status. They are 
civilians who have engaged in DPH, without being entitled to do so.199   
GC III Article 4A(4) extends the scope of persons entitled to POW status beyond combatants. POW 
status is granted to persons accompanying the armed forces without being members thereof.200 This 
refers to private contractors, who i.e. perform service or support functions to the armed forces.201 If 
they engage in DPH, they lose their entitlement to treatment and protection as a POW if captured or 
detained.202 Another extension is found in (6) where civilian participants of a levee en masse are 
granted POW status upon capture.203  
POWs are entitled to humane treatment, as they do not pose a threat to the lives of the adversary, 
once they are captured.204 The purpose of keeping them detained or captured is to exclude them 
from further participation in military operations. It is not a punishment for their previous 
participation.205 The combatant’s privilege protects them from punishment for their previous 
participation in hostilities.  
Civilians who have been captured or detained by the adverse party after having engaged in DPH, who 
do not fall within the mentioned extensions206, are not entitled to the treatment and protection 
awarded to POWs.207 If there is doubt whether the individual meets the prerequisites, GC III Article 5 
grants the individual such protection and treatment, “until such time as [the] status has been 
determined by a competent tribunal”.208 Hence, until the tribunal has determined the status, there is 
a presumption of POW status if there is “any doubt”.  
As a result, a great number of civilians who have engaged in DPH will not be entitled to POW status in 
the event of capture or detainment. This raises the question of whether these civilians are rendered 
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at the grace of their captors. The treatment of civilians who are not entitled to POW status will be 
examined in section 3.5.  
3.4. Subject to Domestic Prosecution and Punishment  
Civilians who have engaged in DPH do not benefit from the combatant’s privilege.209 Unlike 
combatants and participants in a levee en masse, civilians are not entitled to engage in a DPH.210 
Hence, they are subject to prosecution and punishment in accordance with the national criminal 
code for any and all crimes they have committed.211 The same applies to members of organized 
armed groups belonging to a non-State party to an armed conflict.212  There is some disagreement 
whether civilians who have taken a DPH can be prosecuted for merely engaging in DPH213 or whether 
there is an additional requirement of commitment of a crime under the domestic criminal legislation 
or international law.214  
The Interpretive Guidance states that the absence “of an express right for civilians to”engage in DPH 
does not imply that such participation is prohibited under IHL.215 However, they may be prosecuted 
and punished to the extent that their activities or membership is a crime under the domestic criminal 
legislation.216  This statement is unfortunate. The foundation of the protection awarded to civilians is 
that they are not a threat to combatants as they generally do not engage in DPH.217 This indicates 
that they can be prosecuted for merely engaging in DPH.   
Civilians, who have engaged in DPH, may be subject to the severe penal consequences under the 
domestic criminal legislation, provided the trial ensures due process and respects the guarantees 
within IHL.218 
Regardless of the combatant’s privilege any individual may be held responsible for his or her 
commitment of a war crime.219 Engaging in DPH is not in itself a war crime punishable under 
international criminal law.220 Therefore, leaving the prosecution of civilian engagement in DPH to 
domestic criminal legislation might be the best approach. If IHL was to deal with all the specific acts 
of DPH it would become a legal maze, which could weaken its standing during armed conflicts.  
3.5. A Minimum Standard of Treatment and Protection  
Civilians who engage in DPH are neither combatants, nor entitled to POW status upon capture. Are 
they entitled to treatment as protected persons in accordance with GC IV, or do they fall outside the 
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protection awarded to victims of armed conflict by the GCs and their APs? This question relates to 
whether there exists a gap of protection for those who are not entitled to POW status under GC III 
and at the same time not entitled to protection under GC IV.221 
 In the Celebrici case, ICTY stated that there is no such gap of protection.222 The Conventions were 
intended to be complementary.223 Accordingly, an individual who is neither entitled to POW status 
after GC III, nor entitled to protection by GC I or II, is a “protected person” under GC IV.224 The official 
interpretation is that there is no gap in the protection between GC III and GC IV. 
The protections awarded to civilians who have engaged in DPH will be explored in the following.  
3.5.1. Protection Under GC IV 
GC IV Article 4(1) defines the scope of “protected persons” as those who find themselves “in the 
hands of a Party to the conflict or an Occupying Power of which they are not nationals”.225 
Accordingly, the individual’s nationality is the determining criterion for protection.226 
However, the right to protection is not unlimited. A civilian in the territory of a party to the conflict 
who is “definitely suspected of or engaged in activities hostile to the security of the State” is not 
entitled to the rights and privileges under GC IV, if the exercise of such would be “prejudicial to the 
security of such State”.227 If a spy, saboteur or others “under definite suspicion of activity hostile to 
the security of the Occupying Power“, is detained in occupied territory, these individuals are deemed 
to have “forfeited [the] rights of communication under” GC IV, if required by “absolute military 
security”.228 
Regardless of these limitations, they shall be treated humanely and are entitled to the prescribed 
“rights of [a] fair and regular trial”.229 In addition they “shall be granted the full rights and privileges 
of a protected person “at the earliest date consistent with the security of the State or Occupying 
Power”.230 
This provision relates to serious allegations, and such activities will most likely amount to DPH.231 
However, it is highly unlikely that this provision regulates the situation of all activities amounting to 
DPH. Those who have engaged in DPH, but who are not subject to the derogations Article 5, remain 
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entitled to the treatment and protections awarded by GC IV, provided they fulfill the nationality 
requirements of Article 4.232  
The question then arises as to the treatment of those subject to the derogations of Article 5, and 
those who do not fulfill the nationality criterion of Article 4. Are these individuals rendered 
unprotected by the GCs, or are they entitled to protection under the provisions of API?  
3.5.2. A Minimum Standard of Protection Under API  
According to Article 45(3) an individual “who has taken part in hostilities”, who “is not entitled to” 
POW status and “does not benefit from more favourable treatment in accordance with” GC IV shall 
at all times have the right to the protections of API Article 75. Article 45(3) must therefore be read in 
conjunction with Article 75.  
The wording of Article 75 indicates that the protections contained therein are minimum standards 
which apply to those who are considered unlawful combatants.233 The reference to GC IV further 
indicates that they are protected under GC IV as long as the nationality requirements of Article 4 are 
fulfilled.234  
Should Article 75 grant a wider or better protection than the GCs, the individual will be subject to 
protections awarded by the former, as it applies to those who” do not benefit from more favourable 
treatment”. The rights and protections therein reflect a minimum standard for those captured or 
detained during IACs, which applies to civilians who have engaged in DPH. Accordingly, these 
individuals are not rendered unprotected in the event of capture or detention by the adverse party, 
merely due to their DPH.235 They “shall be treated humanely in all circumstances”, and “shall as a 
minimum [...] without adverse distinction” enjoy respect for their “person, honour, convictions, and 
religious practices”.236 The 2nd paragraph lists acts that are prohibited at any time and in any place. 
The 3rd paragraph contains rights in relations to arrest, detainment or internment. Finally, the 4th 
paragraph contains minimum judicial and procedural guarantees. These are fundamental human 
rights guarantees which are rules of customary international law.237 
3.5.3. Equal Application of a Minimum Standard in Non-International Armed Conflicts?  
APII applies to NIACs.238 It does not apply to “situations of internal disturbances and tensions” as 
these are not armed conflicts.239 The protection awarded to civilians is contained in Article 13.240 APII 
does not contain any provisions regarding a minimum standard of treatment, but Article 4 contains 
fundamental guarantees of humane treatment to all who do not engage in, or have ceased to engage 
in DPH. 
Additionally Common Article 3 to the GCs contains an obligation to ensure a minimum of humane 
treatment to “persons taking no active part in hostilities” and those rendered hors de combat during 
NIACs. The wording in the French version is “participant directement”. The use of “active” vs 
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“directement” does not affect the meaning of the provision, as the authentic texts are presumed to 
“have the same meaning”.241 The wording implies that it does not apply to those who have engaged 
in DPH. It is argued that these civilians have forfeited the protections contained in therein.242  
The wording further indicates that Article 3 does not apply to IACs. However, it contains a minimum 
standard, which suggest that these apply during all armed conflicts. Hence, no person should be 
subject to a lesser treatment than the minimum.243 In the Nicaragua Case the ICJ stated that 
Common Article 3 contained “minimum rules applicable to international and non-international 
conflicts”. 244  This statement does not seem compatible with Common Article 3. However, the 
minimum standard of treatment prohibits “outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating 
and degrading treatment”. It also contains “judicial guarantees which are recognized as indispensible 
by civilized people” during trial.245 The treatment shall be “without any adverse distinction”.246 The 
provision also lists acts which are prohibited at any time, in any place.247 The drafters of the GCs 
wanted to ensure that there was a minimum standard of humanitarian protections for the victims of 
internal armed conflicts.248  
Nevertheless, customary international law contains minimum standards of treatment and protection 
applicable in IACS and NIACs.249 These standards apply independently from the application of 
Common Article 3.  Accordingly, no individual is rendered outside the protections awarded to victims 
of armed conflicts.  
4. Practical Implications of DPH 
4.1. Is There a Presumption of Engagement in DPH?  
There is some disagreement whether there exists a presumption that the civilian is or is not engaged 
in DPH, in case of doubt whether the activities amount to DPH. This question is important when 
determining the status and protections awarded to civilians who pose a threat during military 
operations.  
There is a presumption of civilian status in situations of doubt during IACs.250 This presumption is an 
important part of the protection of civilians.251 Despite its importance, the rule of doubt is not a rule 
of customary international law.252  
Boothby argues that there is no presumption that civilians are not directly participating.253 He 
compares the civilian engaged in repeated DPH to the uninvolved and protected civilian. The object 
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and purpose of the treaties indicate that they must be interpreted in a manner which avoids a rule of 
DPH which pose an increased risk to the latter category. The notion of DPH is essential in ensuring 
the protection of civilians. It must be interpreted in a manner that makes sense on the modern 
battlefield, and must therefore allow for the targeting of those who engage in DPH on a recurring or 
persistent basis.254 
 Melzer on the other hand, argues that the treaties leaves no doubt that loss of protection due to 
DPH is temporary. The civilian loses protection against direct attack as a consequence of an ongoing 
individual activity, and not as a sanction of previous engagement in DPH.255 Therefore, “everything 
reasonable feasible must be done to determine” whether the civilian is engaged in DPH or not before 
s/he may be attacked.256 Melzer argues that there is a presumption that civilians are not engaged in a 
DPH.257   
Schmitt argues that DPH must be interpreted liberally, in favour of finding DPH in situations of 
doubt.258 If the interpretation allows for civilians who are “inextricably involved in the conduct of 
ongoing hostilities” to remain protected, this could cause disrespect for the protections awarded to 
civilians by combatants who are endangered by their activities.259 This approach creates an incentive 
for civilians not to participate, and keep their distance from armed conflicts. This way, civilians can 
avoid being directly targeted, as well as criminal charges due to their participation. This broad 
interpretation might seem counter-intuitive, but encouraging them to stay away from military 
operations will enhance the protection of the civilian population.260 
The object and purpose of the GCs and their Additional Protocols is to protect the victims of armed 
conflict, and regulate the conduct of hostilities. The presumption of civilian status261 and the 
protections awarded to civilians is an important aspect of this. The notion of DPH is a limitation on 
the latter, and allows for the targeting of such civilians.262 There is an important distinction between 
status and entitlement to protection. The individual does not lose his or her status as a civilian due to 
DPH, but loses the protection from direct attack awarded to civilians.263 Civilians engaged in DPH lose 
protection from direct attack due to engagement in activities inconsistent with their status as 
civilians.264   
The argument that DPH should be interpreted liberally in order to ensure respect for IHL, which in 
turn would enhance the protection of the civilian population, has its merits. In regards to modern 
armed conflict, such an interpretation might even be necessary, in enabling the armed forces to take 
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out civilians who pose a threat. However, the general rule is that civilians are protected from direct 
attack, and the dangers arising from military operations.265 Expanding the scope of DPH might have 
dire consequences for the civilian in question. The urban setting of modern conflicts puts a great 
number of civilians at risk of being directly targeted due to DPH. This indicates that one should be 
careful when applying DPH and its consequences to those who may not have engaged in such 
activities. 
My recommendation is therefore that a strict application of DPH be applied, so that there is a 
presumption that the civilian is not engaged in DPH in situations of doubt. This interpretation is 
consistent with the presumption of civilian status266, the general protection awarded to civilians267, 
and the overall object and purpose of the GCs and their APs.  
4.2. Capture or Kill?  
As a consequence of DPH, the civilian becomes a military target, and may be attacked for the 
duration of his or her engagement. A question then arises as to the means and methods with which 
these civilians may be targeted. Is there an obligation to, if possible, capture them, or can they be 
killed regardless of the circumstances? This question illustrates the connection between IHL and 
international human rights.  
IHL applies only during armed conflicts, and not during internal disturbances or tensions, and 
international human rights law applies both in time of peace and war.268 However, IHL is considered 
lex spesialis where these subsets both regulate the specific circumstances.269 The human rights 
provide protection in the legal loopholes of IHL.270  
Combatants are obligated by IHL to choose means and methods of combat which limits the injury or 
killing of civilians.271 In the Targeted Killings case the Court stated that  
“... a civilian [engaged in DPH] cannot be attacked at such time as he is doing so, if less 
harmful means can be employed. [...O]ne must choose the [military means] whose harm to 
the human rights of the harmed person is smallest. [...I]f a terrorist taking a [DPH] can be 
arrested, interrogated, and tried, those are the means which should be employed [...] Trial is 
preferable to use of force. A rule-of-law state employs, to the extent possible, procedures of 
law, and not procedures of force ...”272 
The Court further stated that even though arrest, investigation or trial may not always be used or 
even be possible, they “should always be considered”.273  
In McCann v. United Kingdom274 three IRA terrorists from Northern Ireland were killed in the streets 
of Gibraltar, by British agents. The ECHR stated that:  
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“... the use of lethal force would be rendered disproportionate if the authorities failed, whether 
deliberately or through lack of proper care, to take steps which would have avoided the 
deprivation of life of the suspects without putting the lives of others at risk.”275 
Furthermore, “it is always necessary to take into account whether there are acceptable alternatives 
to the use of lethal force”.276 A strict and compelling test of necessity must be employed when 
determining if lethal force is necessary to fight terrorism in the prevailing circumstances.277 In 
addition, the response must be proportional to the received threat.278  
The “purpose of the conduct of hostilities is not to kill the enemy, but to defeat him, even if it should 
be necessary to kill him to achieve that goal”.279 A result of this is the prohibition on denial of 
quarter.280 Any order of liquidation, as well as threats and execution of liquidation, with or without 
orders is prohibited.281 In addition, a refusal to accept surrender and killing those hors de combat 
would violate this prohibition.282 If it is not feasible to capture and evacuate the civilian under the 
circumstances, s/he “may be disarmed and must be released without further harm.”283 This indicates 
that there is an obligation to capture, where civilians engaged in DPH surrender or become hors de 
combat. If that is not the case, s/he may be killed, provided that the use of lesser means is not 
required by the principle of military necessity, or principle of proportionality. This is reasonable as 
civilians engaged in DPH, are legitimate targets and liable to direct attack for the duration of their 
DPH.284   
However, it is not lawful to liquidate every civilian due to their engagement in DPH.285 If there exists 
an “equivalent non-lethal alternative” which achieves the concrete and direct military advantage, 
this alternative must be employed.286 Accordingly, these civilians may be attacked during their 
engagement in DPH, as they are legitimate military targets. This alternative ceases to be an option 
when the engagement in DPH is over. At that time, less harmful alternatives such as arrest and 
prosecution can be applied. Provided that the guarantees of due process are respected, they may be 
punished for the crimes they committed.287 
If mere suspicion of DPH, i.e. terrorism, allowed combatants to kill such civilians it would seriously 
undermine the fundamental principle of distinction.288 Additionally, attacks against civilians who are 
not engaged in DPH, may amount to a war crime.289  
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Accordingly, there seems to exist an obligation to use the least amount of force possible when 
responding to civilians who engage in DPH. This view is in accordance with the principle of military 
necessity, the principle of distinction and the minimum standards of treatment. It is my opinion that 
civilians engaged in DPH cannot be killed if a less harmful mean is available. The evaluation of 
available means must take into consideration the danger to the civilian population and the threat 
posed by the individual. However, killing is only an option when the civilian is actually engaged in 
DPH, and never an option when the engagement is over. As a reaction to previous DPH, the civilian 
can be arrested, tried and punished for his or her actions, but not killed on the spot prior to a trial. 
However, after a fair trial the civilian may be subject to severe punishment, even death.  
5. Concluding remarks  
As this thesis has shown the application of the consequences of DPH is not without problems. The 
lack of a recognized definition provides States with a significant freedom in regards to which 
activities amount to DPH. An equal application of these consequences is contingent upon a coherent 
definition. The Interpretive Guidance is an important step in the process of clarifying the content of 
DPH and its suggested definition provides an excellent basis for further discussion. Based on the 
critiques of the Interpretive Guidance I do not think that this is the last word in regards to 
codification of a definition.  Nevertheless, it is easier said than done to come to an agreement on a 
coherent definition of DPH.  
The Interpretive Guidance provides a workable guidance as to the duration of the temporal scope of 
loss of protection from direct attack for civilians engaged in DPH. This is important to combatants 
applying the concept of DPH to civilians during armed conflicts.  However, the codification of IHL has 
not been able to keep up to speed with the developments of modern conflicts.  The increasing 
presence of civilians who accompany the armed forces, as well as civilians engaged in DPH, has 
contributed to blurring the distinction between combatants and civilians. If IHL is to be respected, 
future codifications must balance the protection of the civilian population against the principle 
military necessity. This indicates that the principle of distinction must take into consideration the 
increased number of civilians participating during armed conflicts as private contractors, civilian 
employees and civilians engaged in DPH without being entitled to do so.   
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